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VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE JUSTIFICATION
OF SEX-DEPENDENT WORKPLACE RESTRICTIONS
ON DRESS AND GROOMING
PATRICK S. SHIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose there are several employees in a particular workplace who
regularly engage in some behavior, x. The employer decides to terminate one of
these employees, P, citing the fact of P’s x-ing. Recognizing that the employer’s
rationale is insufficient to explain the decision to terminate P while not
terminating the other x-ing employees, P challenges the employer to justify this
differential adverse treatment.
A logically satisfactory response would require the employer to identify
some way in which P, or P’s x-ing, is different—i.e., some argument by which
P’s x-ing provides sufficient reason for P’s termination, while not providing
comparable reason for terminating the other x-ing employees. Of course, the
employer may not be required legally to have any good reason at all for
terminating P, so no such response may be necessary, let alone forthcoming. But
there is, presumably, at least one important constraint on the reasons to which
the employer can lawfully appeal in order to explain why P was singled out for
his x-ing: those reasons cannot be discriminatory ones.
But what does this mean? It is tempting to think that it must mean, at least,
that the employer cannot lawfully justify P’s differentially adverse treatment
relative to other x-ing employees simply by appealing to the fact of P’s race,
1
color, religion, sex, or national origin. For example, if the behavior in question
(x-ing) was arriving late to work, the employer surely could not justify
terminating P while not terminating other similarly tardy employees simply by
citing the fact that P is, say, of Asian descent. As a matter of law, P’s race simply
cannot be a consideration that provides reason for treating P’s x-ing differently
from that of other employees.
But is it really true—for all x and for all P—that the employer in our simple
hypothetical case could not lawfully justify the differential adverse treatment of
P by appealing to the fact of P’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?
Even without resorting to elaborately concocted counterexamples, we can assign
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at least one value to x that puts the answer into doubt: Let x be “wearing frilly
2
pink dresses”; let P be a man; and let the other x-ing employees be women.
Imagine, now, that the employer responds to P’s demand for a justification of
his being singled out for his x-ing by declaring, “I am firing you and not them
because you are a man, and they are women.”
We may or may not be inclined to credit this unvarnished response as
adequate from the perspective of a progressive understanding of sex or gender
discrimination. Yet, we would surely hesitate to assert—at least as a descriptive
claim about the current law—that the employer’s explicit appeal to P’s sex as the
reason for treating him differently establishes ipso facto the fact of intentional
discrimination. On the contrary, it is likely that most courts would decline to
find actionable sex discrimination here. This implies that there are at least some
circumstances in which an employer can legally maintain a policy under which
certain behaviors can provide reason to take adverse action against men but not
women, and vice versa. In other words, an employer’s differentially adverse
treatment of one employee as compared to another can sometimes be justified
by appeal to the employee’s sex, to the effect that—as in our hypothetical—the
employer can take adverse action against employees of one sex for engaging in
behavior that is deemed acceptable for employees of the other sex.
This implication is at the same time unsurprising and deeply puzzling. It is
unsurprising inasmuch as, at some level, one wants to say that of course current
employment discrimination law recognizes a legally relevant difference between
men and women in the context of regulations governing the way they present
themselves in the workplace. Is it not stating the obvious to observe that the law
does not require employers to ignore all social norms tied to sex? Would it not
be an exercise in absurdity even to entertain the notion that an employer
unlawfully discriminates against male employees by restricting their entry into
3
the women’s washroom, or vice versa?
Yet, as appealing as this sort of deflating, bullet-biting response may be, it
does not answer the deep—or at least nagging—question that remains. My
simple hypothetical suggests that we cannot say, as a general rule, that an
employee’s sex is always irrelevant to the standards of evaluation that justify the
employment actions that affect him or her. This seems particularly evident in

2. I borrow the figure of the man in the “frilly pink dress” from Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1995).
3. Boyce v. Safeway Stores, 351 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding that the defendant’s
beard and hair-length policies, applicable only to male employees, “are not shown to discriminate on
the basis of sex any more than a condition of employment that requires males and females to use
separate toilet facilities, or bars males but not females from wearing skirts”); see also Dodge v. Giant
Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: the Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000) (describing the standard view that
regulations requiring men to dress and groom themselves differently from women “no more
constitute discrimination ‘on the basis of sex . . . than a condition of employment that requires males
and females to use separate toilet facilities’” (quoting Boyce, 351 F. Supp. at 403)); cf. Doe v. Boeing
Co., 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993) (holding that employer was not required to permit gender-dysphoric
biologically male employee to wear women’s clothing or use women’s restrooms); Goins v. W.
Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001) (holding that designation of separate restrooms based on
biological sex was not in violation of state antidiscrimination statute).
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cases involving restrictions concerning the manner in which an employee may
present the appearance of his or her physical body to others in the workplace.
But if we presume that there is some legal principle that says that an employee’s
sex can—at least as to those kinds of restrictions—determine whether a
particular employment action is legally justified with respect to him or her, then
how can that principle be reconciled with the general legal prohibition of
discrimination because of sex? In other words: Suppose it is true that at least
some differential treatment based on sex is legally permitted (regarded as nondiscriminatory) in the context of workplace restrictions on dress and physical
appearance. Then what, if any, is the more general principle that allows us to
distinguish action that depends on consideration of sex, or “sex-dependent”
action, in that context from sex-dependent action that is objectionable as
discrimination in other contexts?
I argue that the primary doctrines of employment discrimination law do
not themselves draw a satisfactory distinction between sex-dependent
restrictions on dress and grooming and actions that uncontroversially qualify as
sex discrimination in other contexts. I contend that supplementary strategies
that courts have used to carve out such restrictions as an area of separate
concern are either inconclusive or question-begging. I then consider whether the
law’s seemingly sui generis approach to sex-dependent restrictions on dress and
grooming can be explained or justified on the grounds that they do not implicate
the main concerns of equality that the legal prohibition of sex discrimination
might be thought to embody. I offer some observations as to what those
concerns might be and discuss how sex-dependent restrictions on personal
presentation in the workplace might be thought to implicate such concerns. I
conclude with a suggestion that the justifiability of the law’s current approach to
sex-dependent dress and grooming restrictions implies a substantive claim
about the possibility and the positive value of preserving a social state of affairs
in which men and women enjoy economic equality but adhere to sex-dependent
social norms in respect of the outward presentation of their bodies to others.
II. ON THE PROBLEM OF REDESCRIPTION
I begin my analysis with a discussion of a persistent and thorny problem
relating to the main issue raised by the hypothetical case presented in the
introduction. One might argue that my characterization of the employer’s
termination of the male employee—for wearing a frilly pink dress—as an action
depending on consideration of sex is problematic at the outset. If my objective is
to determine whether restrictions on personal presentation can be analyzed as
sex discrimination, is it not impermissible question-begging to characterize the
employer’s action in my hypothetical as sex-dependent? After all, the employer’s action could, with equal plausibility, be described as a sex-neutral
restriction on “inappropriate attire” or as a response to indecorous behavior in
4
the employer’s workplace, or perhaps as a sex-neutral effort to protect customer
or client sensibilities. The objection, then, is that if I am going to construct an
4. Cf. Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (characterizing a judge’s
requirement that a male attorney wear a necktie as a matter of “decorous professional behavior and
appearance” dictated by “current fashion,” which did not constitute sex discrimination).
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argument about whether workplace restrictions on an employee’s mode of
personal presentation constitute objectionable sex discrimination, I cannot
simply help myself to the characterization of such restrictions as actions based
on consideration of sex.
This difficulty is an important one. But I regard it not so much as an
objection to my treatment of my opening hypothetical than as an alternative
way of stating the very same question that I seek to address in this article. It is
surely true that the employer’s termination of our hypothetical cross-dressing
male employee could be described in facially sex-neutral terms—e.g., as the
enforcement of a general requirement of “appropriate” workplace attire or of
“professional” behavior. And we might even re-imagine the original hypothetical to suppose that this sex-neutral characterization could be substantiated
with evidence that female employees had been fired for comparable infractions
5
(whatever those might be).
I have no interest in denying the potential plausibility of these
characterizations. The fact that an employer’s termination of a cross-dressing
male on account of his cross-dressing can be described in alternative, facially
sex-neutral terms does not preclude our asking whether that action constitutes
objectionable discrimination. For however else the employer’s action might be
described, it will remain subject to description as the firing of a male employee
on account of his wearing a frilly pink dress. And so long as the employer
would not regard the wearing of a frilly pink dress as a reason for firing a
female employee, the male employee will be able to articulate a simple claim of
differential treatment: he was terminated for an action that would not have been
regarded as grounds for termination with respect to a female employee. Since
this consideration was regarded as grounds for termination only because he was
male, it follows that he was terminated because of his sex.
I want to be clear that I do not argue that it follows from the availability of
the sex-dependent characterization of my hypothetical employer’s action that
the action is discriminatory. My point is that the availability of the sex-neutral
characterization shows no more and no less than the availability of the sexdependent one. Let me put it another way. A skeptic might argue that since we
do not have any reason (in the absence of further facts) to privilege the
description of the employer’s action as a sex-dependent termination over its
description in more neutral terms, any attempt on my part to analyze the action
6
as sex discrimination will be based on a hopelessly unstable premise. But this
objection misconstrues the nature of my inquiry. To repeat, I do not mean to
suggest that the possibility of describing an action in sex-dependent terms

5. It is possible that there is nothing a female employee could do that would be precisely
analogous to a male employee wearing a frilly pink dress. But this is beside the point of the objection
I am considering, which is simply that the firing of a cross-dressing male could very plausibly be
described in sex-neutral terms as the firing of an employee for wearing attire that was inappropriate
for the workplace.
6. This skeptical viewpoint is related to one that has been given voice by Kimberly Yuracko.
See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality,
83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 188–98 (2004).
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7

proves that the action constitutes sex discrimination. By the same token,
however, the availability of a sex-neutral redescription of my hypothetical male
employee’s termination is not necessarily preclusive of a description of that
same action as a sex-dependent one.
So, although one might think that an analysis of whether restrictions on
dress and grooming constitute sex discrimination requires a threshold inquiry
regarding how we are to adjudicate between competing sex-dependent and sexneutral characterizations of the same action, what I am suggesting is that such
an inquiry is really just an alternate formulation of precisely the question that
motivates this article. The question of how to choose between such competing
characterizations of sex-dependent restrictions on dress and grooming is the
same as the question of whether there exists any coherent, non-arbitrary basis
for exempting such restrictions from the ambit of objectionable sex
discrimination.
III. TWO DEFINITIONS
In the interest of avoiding potentially tendentious characterizations, I begin
my analysis by offering a pair of definitions. In this article, I shall use the term
“sex-dependent workplace restriction” to refer to workplace requirements or
proscriptions, however they might be characterized, whose application or
enforcement with regard to a particular employee is predicated on, or cannot be
8
determined without consideration of, that employee’s sex. Thus, for example, a
restriction that specifically instructed all and only female employees to conform
to a certain dress requirement would obviously be a sex-dependent restriction.
A policy that required all employees to wear “appropriate business attire” might
also be a sex-dependent restriction to the extent that determinations of what was
“appropriate” depended upon consideration of the sex of the subject employee.
A policy that required all employees to wear a hat would be a sex-independent
restriction. A requirement that short-haired employees wear caps while longhaired employees wear hair nets would also be sex-independent—even if, as a
practical matter, this meant that the hair-net requirement applied only to female
9
employees. Similarly, an appearance code requiring all employees to keep their
beards trimmed would be a sex-independent restriction, not a sex-dependent
one, even though (presumably) it would affect only male employees, because its
application to any employee would not require consideration of that employee’s
sex.

7. Indeed, I do not even suggest that the particular action described in my opening
hypothetical should necessarily be regarded as objectionably discriminatory.
8. I prefer the term “sex-dependent” to the phrase “sex-differentiated” just because it seems to
more naturally encompass not only those restrictions that are explicitly formulated in sexdifferentiated terms, but also those restrictions that might be given a neutral formulation but whose
application is still predicated on consideration of sex. Nothing of substance, however, should be
thought to turn on my choice of terminology.
9. If we varied the facts a bit such that it turned out that the requirement, although sexindependent on its face, was actually applied in practice such that only women with long hair were
required to wear hair nets while men with long hair were permitted to wear caps, then the
requirement would be a sex-dependent one under my nomenclature, insofar as its actual application
was predicated on the subject employee’s sex.

16__SHIN.DOC

2/8/2007 2:09 PM

496 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

Volume 14:491

2007

Second, I shall use the locution “workplace restriction on personal
presentation” to refer to employment requirements and policies that restrict the
manner in which an employee is permitted to present the surface of his or her
face, head, hair, and body to others in the workplace. Thus, restrictions on
personal presentation include all policies that traditionally are grouped under
the rubric of “appearance standards” or regulations regarding “dress and
grooming,” such as policies governing workplace attire, uniforms, hair length,
10
beards, jewelry, makeup and cosmetics, and so on.
IV. INTENTIONALITY
Current employment discrimination law already provides a test that
determines when an action that is susceptible to alternative characterizations
should be regarded, for legal purposes, as differential treatment “because of”
one of the factors that is excluded from consideration by Title VII, including
11
sex. We must view the action as discriminatory, even if a non-discriminatory
characterization of the action is possible, when a forbidden consideration forms
part of the intention or motivation of the actor who is alleged to have acted
12
discriminatorily. One might argue, therefore, that there is a perfectly
straightforward way of deciding whether the employer in my opening
hypothetical engaged in sex discrimination: If the employer acted with a
discriminatory motive or intent, then we should regard the termination of the
cross-dressing male employee as discriminatory. However, if the employer
acted with no such motive or intent, then we should regard the termination as a
non-discriminatory enforcement of a workplace dress code (“appropriate attire
required”) that applies equally to men and women alike.
To be sure, there is no denying that, under current approaches, the
intention of the alleged discriminator is the nominal focus of the legal inquiry, at
13
least in a disparate treatment action. But if our purpose is to work toward a

10. Policies that speak to a person’s build, stature, or physical conditioning—such as height and
weight restrictions or strength and endurance requirements—do not fall under my definition of
restrictions on personal presentation. I separate the latter restrictions from the former because they
do seem to me to be of a slightly different character, which is not to say they are any more or less
objectionable. By and large, however, I think that my analysis with regard to restrictions on personal
presentation will apply equally to restrictions on physical build, stature, and conditioning. And
indeed, I treat some of the case law regarding the analysis of such restrictions under the
discrimination laws as directly relevant to the proper treatment of restrictions on personal
presentation.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
12. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (“The ‘factual
inquiry’ in a Title VII case is ‘whether [sic] the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff.’” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))).
13. See Id. Of course, even under current approaches, the intent of the alleged discriminator is
not the focus of inquiry in disparate impact cases arising under Section 703(k)(1) of Title VII, which
permits a plaintiff to establish discrimination by proving that the employment practice in question
unjustifiably created differentially adverse burdens as between men and women. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000); see generally Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert
Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 953–67 (2005) (explaining the distinction between claims
of disparate impact and disparate treatment). However, as I explained above, the question
underlying the inquiry of this paper is whether, or in what circumstances, restrictions on personal
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theoretical understanding of how to analyze sex-dependent workplace
restrictions on personal presentation under the employment discrimination
laws, to say that the classification of a particular presentational restriction as
discriminatory or non-discriminatory depends on the employer’s intent is like
saying that negligence liability depends on the defendant’s fault, or that criminal
liability depends on mens rea. Accepting the truth of the general proposition
does not help us move toward an understanding of the specific considerations
that are relevant to the requisite analysis.
Suppose, for example, that my original hypothetical employer, after firing a
male employee for wearing a frilly pink dress, were to concede that the decision
to terminate the employee was motivated by a belief that it is inappropriate for
men to wear dresses to work, and that it was relevant to—indeed, dispositive
of—the termination decision that the employee was in fact a man. Would these
admissions be sufficient to establish that the employer acted on a discriminatory
motive?
If the answer were yes, it would be difficult to see how we could possibly
avoid the conclusion that all adverse employment actions based on sexdependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation constitute sex
discrimination. For in every case in which adverse action is taken against a male
(or female) employee on the basis of a judgment that the employee’s personal
presentation was inappropriate for a man (or woman) in the relevant workplace,
it will be trivially true that the employer’s action will have been based on an
explicit consideration of the employee’s sex. It will also be true that the
employer would not have taken that same action if the employee’s sex had not
14
been taken into account. This, arguably, would be sufficient to satisfy common
15
formulations of what it means to act on a discriminatory motive and hence for
16
an action to be characterizable as prima facie discrimination. Yet, under current
legal approaches, it is simply not the case that all sex-dependent restrictions on
17
personal presentation constitute sex discrimination.

presentation whose conditions of compliance are different for men and women should be analyzed
as disparate treatment “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
14. In my original hypothetical, the employee presumably would not have been fired for
wearing a frilly pink dress if the employer had ignored the fact that the employee was male. Of
course, “but for” causation will not be present in cases where an employee is fired for conduct that
would have been equally inappropriate for an employee of the opposite sex. In such cases, however,
the action in question would not be based on a sex-dependent restriction or policy, by definition.
15. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (stating, in the context of a mixed
motives case, that proof of non-discriminatory motive requires showing that the employer “would
have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account”).
16. See Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 73 F.3d 128, 131–32 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing
that proof of the employer’s “open and explicit use of gender” as a basis for action is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination).
17. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(“We have long recognized that companies may differentiate between men and women in
appearance and grooming policies, and so have other circuits.”).
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Thus, if we hold fixed the proposition that adverse employment actions
18
done with discriminatory intent constitute discrimination, then it would
appear to follow—as a matter of positive law—that explicitly taking into
account an employee’s sex for purposes of making a judgment about the
workplace-appropriateness of his or her mode of personal presentation does not
necessarily constitute discriminatory intent or motive. But if express
consideration of an employee’s sex as part of the basis for taking adverse action
against him or her does not constitute discriminatory intent or motive, then it
19
becomes unclear what does.
What becomes apparent, instead, is that the notion of “discriminatory
intent” in this context is itself a notion that is in need of explanation, and not one
that can explain the permissibility of sex-dependent restrictions on personal
presentation. In other words, even assuming that discriminatory intent has some
20
discernible, independent meaning in this context, it is going to take some
theoretical work to flesh out the content of that notion and to justify its relevance
to the determination of sex discrimination vel non. Certainly, the notion of
discriminatory intent in this context is too opaque to help us distinguish
between discriminatory and non-discriminatory sex-dependent restrictions on
personal presentation. It explains nothing to say that such a restriction should be
regarded as an objectionably discriminatory policy, rather than a neutral one,
whenever its enforcement involves an intent to discriminate.
V. STEREOTYPING
Courts often say that it constitutes impermissible sex discrimination to take
adverse action against an employee on the basis of impermissible sex or gender

18. Even recent cases upholding sex-dependent presentational restrictions against sex
discrimination challenges have stated that proof of discriminatory intent is sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. See, e.g., Id. at 1109.
19. The question becomes even more puzzling if we consider how the legal assessment of
discriminatory intent might change in a case that presented an analogous question concerning
discrimination on the basis of race, rather than sex. Imagine, for example, that instead of firing the
male employee for wearing a frilly pink dress, my hypothetical employer had fired an Asian
employee for dying his hair blond, while not taking any action against non-Asian employees who
had exhibited the same behavior. The employer claims that the termination was based on a race
neutral requirement that all employees maintain a professional and business-like appearance in the
workplace. Now, if the employer were to concede that the termination was motivated by a belief that
it is unprofessional for Asians to wear blonde hair in the workplace, and that it was relevant to the
termination decision that this employee was in fact Asian, how might we suppose a court would
come out on the question whether there remained a genuine issue of discriminatory intent? I would
think that the employer’s admissions should establish discriminatory intent beyond peradventure.
Cf. Post, supra note 3, at 34 (expressing a “strong[] susp[icion]” that every court would regard as
discriminatory “a grooming code that require[d] blacks, but not whites, to have short hair”
(alterations added)). And I would think so, despite at least one court’s apparent conclusion to the
contrary. See Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel, No. Civ.A.99-3891, 2000 WL 1610775 (E.D. La. 2000)
(finding no racial discrimination where employer prohibited African-American woman from
wearing blonde hair).
20. The more likely story, I believe, is that acting on discriminatory intent in this particular
context has no meaning other than acting on the basis of considerations that are legally unfit to
justify the employment action in question. Obviously, if this is the case, then the notion of
discriminatory intent is completely derivative of the substantive question of justification.
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21

stereotypes. I argue in this section that the prevailing attitude of tolerance with
regard to certain sex-dependent restrictions on dress and grooming is difficult to
square with the general prohibition of stereotyping discrimination, at least
under one of two alternative understandings of that concept.
I find it helpful to distinguish between two different kinds of behavior that
seem to fall under the rubric of stereotyping, which I will refer to as (1)
22
prescriptive stereotyping and (2) epistemic stereotyping.
Prescriptive
stereotyping on the basis of a protected group classification (race, sex, national
23
origin, etc.) occurs when an agent acts adversely toward an individual or set of
individuals on the basis of a judgment that the individual’s behavior is
inappropriate, socially unacceptable, or disfavored in virtue of the individual’s
membership (or apparent membership) in the group defined by that
24
classification. Thus, an employer engages in prescriptive stereotyping when,
for example, the employer’s refusal to promote a female employee is motivated
25
by a judgment that her aggressive personality is inappropriate for a woman, or
(at least in the Sixth Circuit) when the employer’s adverse action against a male
26
employee is rooted in a judgment that his manner is too “effeminate.”
Epistemic stereotyping on the basis of a protected group classification occurs
27
28
when an agent acts based on an unreasonable belief about an individual’s
21. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111; Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2004); Craft v.
Metromedia, Inc.¸ 766 F.2d 1205, 1215–16 (8th Cir. 1985); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of
Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979).
22. A similar distinction has been drawn by Professors Carbado, Gulati, and Ramachandran.
See Devon Carbado, G. Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, Makeup and Women at Work, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 140–44 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006). Likewise, Anthony
Appiah has distinguished between “statistical stereotypes,” “false [belief] stereotypes,” and
“normative stereotypes.” See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 41, 48–49 (2000). For Appiah, statistical and false stereotypes “involve intellectual error—either
misunderstanding the facts . . . or misunderstanding their relevance,” while “there is no reason to
suppose that normative stereotypes as such must be wrong, or that public actions grounded on them
are to be criticized.” Id. at 49.
23. Some might want to say that it is possible for an actor to engage in stereotyping by adopting
a certain belief or harboring an attitude without taking action. I have no objection to such a view but
limit my discussion of stereotyping to cases of action, since employment discrimination claims
necessarily presuppose adverse action.
24. One might broaden my definition of prescriptive stereotyping actions to include actions that
are beneficial to an individual when such actions are based on a judgment that the individual’s
behavior is socially exemplary in virtue of the individual’s membership in some protected group. I
would have no objection to this broadened definition. For purposes of this article, however, I use
“prescriptive stereotyping” to refer primarily to adverse employment action.
25. Cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. Notice that an employer can act on a judgment that an
employee’s behavior is inappropriate, but not inappropriate in virtue of the employee’s membership
in any particular class. Thus, an employer who fires a female employee for having an aggressive
personality does not engage in what I am referring to as prescriptive stereotyping if the employer’s
action was based on a judgment that the employee’s behavior was inappropriate in virtue of the
nature of her job (say, customer service) and not because she is a woman.
26. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572–73; see also Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir.
2005) (following Smith).
27. Again, it might be better to allow that the adoption of a belief or attitude might constitute
epistemic stereotyping. My limitation of stereotyping to cases of action simply reflects the legal
requirement of adverse action as an element of a discrimination claim.
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attributes that is predicated on that individual’s membership in that protected
group. An example of epistemic stereotyping is an employer who refuses to hire
women to do a particular job based on a belief that, say, men generally work
29
harder than women. Thus, whereas prescriptive stereotyping based on a group
classification involves acting in a way that expresses disapproval of an
individual’s failure to conform to certain expectations about how members of
30
that group should behave (or about what behavior is appropriate for them),
epistemic stereotyping involves acting on a belief based on the inferred
attribution of some matter of fact to members of that group because of their
31
membership in that group.
Do sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation—such as a
proscription against male cross-dressing or a requirement that women wear
makeup—involve stereotyping in either the prescriptive or epistemic sense? The
most natural answer is that such restrictions do not generally involve
stereotyping in the epistemic sense but do involve stereotyping in the
prescriptive sense. I believe, however, that they can involve stereotyping in both
senses.
The case for prescriptive stereotyping is straightforward. Consider again
my hypothetical case of the cross-dressing male employee. Assume that the
employee’s termination was based on a judgment that it was inappropriate for
him to be wearing women’s clothing in the workplace. We presume that the
employer would not have come to that judgment if the employee had been a
woman; the employer would not have thought it inappropriate for a female
employee to wear that identical attire in the same workplace. The termination of
the cross-dressing male employee thus seems clearly predicated on a judgment
32
that his behavior was socially inappropriate because he was male. It follows
from my definition that the employer’s action in that hypothetical case
constitutes prescriptive stereotyping. A similar account could be given of

28. Some may disagree with my decision to define epistemic stereotyping as unreasonable. This
definition seems to me consistent, however, with the common legal usage of the term in the sense I
am trying to identify. An alternative to my approach would be to define epistemic stereotyping in
more neutral terms and then distinguish as necessary between reasonable epistemic stereotyping
and unreasonable epistemic stereotyping. Once again, nothing of substance should be thought to
turn on this terminological choice.
29. Cf. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment
Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345, 353–54 (1980) (reviewing social science research showing how
generalizations about women’s abilities and capacities can affect hiring and promotion decisions).
30. Here, my understanding of “prescriptive stereotyping” departs significantly from Appiah’s
understanding of action based on a “normative stereotype.” See Appiah, supra note 22, at 49.
31. Some instances of discrimination might involve stereotyping in both the prescriptive and
epistemic senses. An example of such double-barreled stereotyping might be the hiring of a man
over a woman for a job requiring long hours on the basis of a belief that it is socially preferable that
women maximize the amount of time they spend at home supporting their families, and that familial
obligations would make it difficult for women to put in an extended work day. Cf. BOB WOODWARD
& SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 123 (Simon & Schuster 1979) (recounting story of Chief Justice
Burger’s explanation to his law clerks of why he refused to hire a female clerk); see also MICHAEL J.
ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 82–83 (6th ed. 2003) (quoting same).
32. Cf. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,
2002).
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33

Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., in which a female employee was terminated
34
for refusing to wear makeup. There, the employee’s termination was based on
her violation of a sex-dependent requirement governing the presentation of
female employees in the workplace. Insofar as that requirement was based on a
judgment that it is socially unacceptable for women not to wear makeup (or
socially preferable that they do), the termination in that case could be regarded
as based on a judgment that the employee’s behavior was socially unacceptable
35
or disfavored because she was a woman. In any event, it should be clear that
many sex-dependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation—and most
particularly, those that reinforce or are parasitic on social conventions of gender
36
performance—will involve prescriptive stereotyping.
It is less clear whether such restrictions generally involve what I have
referred to as epistemic stereotyping. One might plausibly argue that
employment actions taken on the basis of such restrictions tend to be based on
dubious or at least debatable factual premises. For example, a common rationale
for the enforcement of such restrictions is that they are important to the
company’s public image and are, thus, a matter of business necessity. But courts
passing on the permissibility of garden-variety restrictions on employee dress
and grooming—such as attire or hair-length requirements—have typically been
willing to accept an employer’s say-so as to the business-relevance of the
37
restrictions in question. One wonders what sort of empirical evidence there
really could be for a belief that a company’s business reputation could be
materially affected in one way or another by whether its female employees keep
38
their fingernails a certain length or style their hair in a certain way.
But a policy that has a bad factual basis is not necessarily a policy that relies
on sex stereotypes. In order to conclude that sex-dependent dress and grooming
requirements depend as a general matter on epistemic sex stereotypes, we
would have to say that such requirements are based on the epistemically
unreasonable attribution of some trait or characteristic to particular individuals
in virtue of their being male or female.

33. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
34. I discuss the Jespersen case in fuller detail below.
35. Even if the employer did not consciously hold a view that it was socially undesirable for
women not to wear makeup, the employer’s action could still constitute prescriptive stereotyping (as
I have defined it) if the action could be causally traced to an unconscious bias that was itself rooted
in a social preference that women wear makeup. Cf. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59–
61 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that acting on subtle, even unconscious, cognitive biases can constitute
discriminatory stereotyping in violation of Title VII).
36. On the other hand, it should also be clear that sex-dependent restrictions that are more
idiosyncratic in nature—imagine, for example, a requirement that male employees wear green shirts
while female employees wear blue shirts—might not involve prescriptive stereotyping at all.
37. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979);
Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
38. See Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124–25 (taking “judicial notice” of the importance of employee
appearance to a company’s public image); see also Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1031 n.15 (expressing
reluctance to second-guess an employer’s business needs with regard to regulating employee
appearance). But cf. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting district
court’s finding that termination of female news anchor had been based in part on results of a viewer
survey concerning the anchor’s appearance).
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The employer who insists on sex-dependent restrictions on personal
presentation in the workplace may hold a variety of beliefs, including
unreasonable ones, about the attributes of men and women who violate those
restrictions. More specifically, the employer may hold beliefs based on
inferences from heterodox gender behavior to negative conclusions about the
character, traits, capacities, and fitness for employment of those who engage in
such behavior. An employer might believe, for example, that employees who
engage in cross-dressing or otherwise refuse to perform their gender in an
orthodox way are employees who are generally prone to violating rules, being
39
disruptive, defying authority, or more broadly, do not share the community’s
40
sense of what is reasonable. To the extent that such inferences are warrantless,
41
attitudes and actions that depend upon them will be open to serious objection.
When I first began to think about this issue, the objection most directly
relevant to these sorts of inferences seemed different from the objection to
epistemic sex stereotyping. It seemed to me that if an employer fires a man for
wearing a dress to work based on the belief that men who wear dresses are
prone to defy managerial authority, the relevant objection would be that the
action may be predicated on an unsound inference about men who wear
dresses, not that it entails any epistemically unreasonable beliefs about men in
general. On that basis, my initial skeptical view was that we should say that the
action might involve epistemic stereotyping of men-who-wear-dresses, but not
epistemic stereotyping of men in general, and it is only the latter kind of
42
stereotyping that implicates the prohibition against sex discrimination.

39. Cf. Catherine Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance
Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2006) (observing that “when an
employer insists upon conformity, the struggle quickly becomes as much about maintaining
discipline and controlling deviance as it is about enforcing particular norms of . . . gender”).
40. Note the distinction between firing a cross-dressing man on the grounds that cross-dressing
is disruptive to the workplace and firing a cross-dressing man on the grounds that a man who crossdresses is likely to engage in (other) disruptive behavior. Cf. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659, 661 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (reporting employer’s claim that “transitional” male-to-female
transsexual’s choice of women’s clothing and makeup was “very disruptive” and “embarrassing to
all concerned”). The present discussion concerns how we should think about the latter kind of
inference. Obviously, however, if courts were to hold that it constitutes sex discrimination to take
adverse action against a man for wearing women’s clothing, such action presumably could not then
be indirectly justified on a rationale that cross-dressing behavior would be disruptive or
“embarrassing.”
41. I think that these inferences could be objectionable in at least two ways. First, they might
simply be empirically unfounded. For instance, there might be no correlation at all between
choosing an unconventional mode of personal presentation and any other aspect of an individual’s
values or attitudes toward rules and authority. Second, there is a certain circularity in drawing
inferences that support adverse employment action against an individual from the fact that the
individual violated restrictions relating to dress and grooming, since the permissibility of such
restrictions is precisely the issue under investigation. If we were to conclude that sex-dependent
restrictions on dress and grooming based on conventional social norms are impermissible, we would
presumably want to regard as illegitimate the drawing of negative inferences about an individual’s
fitness for employment from the fact that the individual violated such norms.
42. In the specific case of male cross-dressing, employers might tend to see that behavior as an
epistemic proxy for being gay or transsexual, in which case the termination of male employees for
cross-dressing might fairly be considered tantamount to actions motivated by a sexual-orientation
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On further reflection, however, it seemed to me that my initial skeptical
view suffered from essentially the same error that I charged to the strategy of
43
“redescription” described earlier. The skeptical claim—namely, that sexdependent restrictions on personal presentation do not involve epistemic sex
stereotyping because such restrictions rest on beliefs about individuals who
engage in unconventional behavior, not beliefs about men or women in
general—is not much different from the claim that firing a male employee for
wearing a dress is not sex discrimination because it is based on a judgment
about the appropriateness of men-in-dresses, not about men in general.
My rejection of the latter claim cannot be consistent with my acceptance of
the former. I said that the characterizability of a sex-dependent restriction in
neutral terms does not settle the question whether the restriction is
objectionable, because (by definition of a sex-dependent restriction) it will
necessarily also remain characterizable as being predicated on consideration of
44
sex. Similarly, even accepting that employers who enforce conventional sexdependent restrictions on dress or grooming may typically do so on the basis of
a belief that individuals who defy such conventions tend to have a problem with
accepting authority (or are otherwise unfit for employment), the relevant
question is whether the belief that P is unfit for employment by virtue of
behavior x depends upon consideration of P’s sex. And it is clear that it does.
That is, it may be true that the employer who fires the male employee for
wearing a dress does so due to a belief that such individuals have trouble
accepting authority; but that belief is nevertheless predicated on the fact of the
employee’s sex, assuming that the employer does not hold the same belief about
female employees who wear dresses. I make no claim here that sex-dependent
restrictions always depend upon unreasonable beliefs about individuals who
defy conventional social norms governing how they present themselves to
45
others. The conclusion I draw is that to the extent that they do, they should be
recognized as objectionable on the grounds of epistemic sex stereotyping.
In summary, sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation—
particularly those that reinforce or piggyback on social conventions of gender—

based animus. Cf. Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Penn. 1993)
(attempting to distinguish between sex discrimination and discrimination based on transsexuality).
43. See supra Part II.
44. My conclusion, to reiterate, was that the question whether sex-dependent restrictions are
discriminatory cannot adequately be resolved by simply choosing one redescriptive strategy over
another.
45. I believe that the question whether such beliefs are reasonable or unreasonable will be
inextricably linked to the question of whether the law should regard sex-dependent restrictions as
discriminatory. If we conclude that sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation should
constitute sex discrimination, then we would probably also conclude that there is good reason to
regard as legally illegitimate any drawing of inferences running from the fact of behavior that would
violate such restrictions to conclusions about an individual’s character or fitness for employment. In
other words, if it constitutes sex discrimination to fire a man for wearing a dress, then it should also
constitute sex discrimination to use the fact of such conduct as a proxy for other attributes rendering
him unfit for employment. On the other hand, if we think that firing a man for wearing a dress does
not constitute sex discrimination, we have no more reason to legally proscribe acting on
unreasonable inferences running from such conduct than we would have to proscribe acting on
unreasonable inferences in general.
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do seem to involve sex stereotyping in the prescriptive sense and may also
involve sex stereotyping in the epistemic sense. But, if adverse employment
actions based on sex stereotyping constitute sex discrimination under current
antidiscrimination law, we seem to be even farther than when we started from
an answer to the question under investigation: how is it possible that sexdependent restrictions on personal presentation do not at least presumptively
constitute impermissible sex discrimination?
VI. THE UNEQUAL BURDENS ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit has recently held that sex discrimination challenges to
workplace restrictions on personal presentation depend upon a determination of
whether the restrictions at issue create “unequal burdens” as between the men
46
and women to whom they apply. More specifically, under the Ninth Circuit’s
approach, a plaintiff can establish that a sex-dependent restriction constitutes
sex discrimination only by demonstrating that it imposes an unequal, greater
47
burden for members of the plaintiff’s sex. Moreover, according to the Jespersen
court, proof of unequal burdens is a necessary element of the plaintiff’s case, not
48
merely evidence that could be incrementally probative of discrimination. In
this section, I consider whether the Ninth Circuit’s unequal burdens approach
provides an adequate answer to the question whether sex-dependent restrictions
on personal presentation constitute sex discrimination.
The basic problem with the unequal burdens test is in providing a non49
circular account of the relevance of this analysis. First, we must bear in mind

46. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108–11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
47. See id. at 1110.
48. See id. at 1111 (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant on grounds that plaintiff
had “failed to create a record establishing that [the grooming restrictions at issue were] more
burdensome for women than for men”); see also Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209
(D.D.C. 2006) (discussing and following Jespersen).
49. The three cases cited by the Jespersen court in support of its invocation of the unequal
burdens test are Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 914
(2001), Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982), and Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977). It is not completely obvious that any of those cases provides
unequivocal support for Jespersen’s understanding of the unequal burdens test. The language in
Gerdom that arguably supports that understanding is clearly dicta, insofar as the allegedly
discriminatory restriction in that case (a maximum weight requirement for flight attendants) was
applied exclusively to female employees, see Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 605, and hence was held to be
discriminatory on its face, see id. at 608. In Frank, which involved a policy enforcing maximum
weight requirements for flight attendants that were different for men and women, the court stated
that “[a]n appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and
women is not disparate treatment,” Frank, 216 F.3d at 854 (alteration added), but after assuming
arguendo that the differential weight requirements could be regarded as an “appearance standard,”
the court held that the weight standards at issue were themselves differentially burdensome on their
face, see id. at 855, and left open the question whether the very fact that there were separate
standards for men and women could establish discriminatory treatment, see id. Finally, in Fountain,
the court held that it was not sex discrimination for the defendant to insist that the male plaintiff don
a necktie even though it had waived similar requirements for its female employees, see Fountain, 555
F.2d at 755–56, but the court seemed to ground its decision on an expansive view of an employer’s
prerogative to maintain separate dress and grooming requirements in accordance with “what its
particular business requires,” id. at 756. Thus, although there may have been hints of the approach in
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that the Jespersen court invoked the unequal burdens test to evaluate a basic
50
claim of disparate treatment under section 703(a) of Title VII, not a claim of
51
disparate impact under section 703(k). The claim that I have been attempting to
analyze is that such restrictions are objectionably discriminatory because they
impose standards of evaluation that are directly dependent upon consideration
of sex—and not primarily because such standards have differentially adverse
consequences as applied.
But if the issue is whether sex-dependent dress and grooming codes
constitute discrimination within the disparate treatment paradigm, how could
the unequal burdens test be relevant at all? If we assume that a challenged
52
restriction involves intentionally adverse treatment on the basis of sex, then
proof of unequal burden should be unnecessary, because a claim of intentionally
differential treatment does not ordinarily depend upon evidence of differentially

Fountain, Gerdom, and Frank, the unequal burdens test was not doctrinally crystallized until the en
banc majority’s opinion in Jespersen.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (2000).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(k) (2000).
The plaintiff herself clearly intended to assert a disparate treatment claim. See Reply Brief of
Appellant Darlene Jespersen at 4, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, No. 0315045 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2003) (“This is a classic Title VII case about the firing of a high-performing,
long-term female employee based on a burdensome appearance rule that required only women to
wear makeup.”), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/360.
pdf. The court’s understanding of the claim as invoking a disparate treatment theory is evidenced by
its citation of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) as setting forth the requirements
of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108–09. It is arguable, furthermore, that a
disparate impact analysis would fundamentally misconceive the charge of discrimination that is
most immediately relevant to sex-dependent dress and grooming codes. See Zahorik v. Cornell
Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The disparate impact theory has been used mainly in the
context of quantifiable or objectively verifiable selection criteria which are mechanically applied and
have consequences roughly equivalent to results obtaining under systematic discrimination.” (citing,
inter alia, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977)); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (distinguishing
between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims). Cf. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 91, 138 (2003) (arguing that disparate impact theory “conceptualizes discrimination solely at the
institutional level” and that it tries to limit racial or gender stratification by “reducing employer
reliance on practices that have an unintended adverse and unnecessary effect on particular groups”);
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1231 (1995) (arguing that courts have used
disparate impact theory to address issues properly labeled disparate treatment). But cf. Sullivan,
supra note 13, at 968 (disagreeing with Krieger and Green).
Indeed, it is doubtful whether a plaintiff challenging an adverse employment action arising out of
a voluntary refusal to comply with an employer’s dress or grooming policy could state a legally
viable claim of disparate impact at all, at least in some jurisdictions. See Lanning v. Se. Penn. Transp.
Auth., 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a physical conditioning requirement that disadvantaged female applicants did not constitute disparate impact, where most female applicants
would be able to meet the requirement with a moderate amount of training). But see Sullivan, supra
note 13, at 971–72 (asserting that the so-called “volitional exception” to disparate impact is “scarcely
well established”).
52. As discussed above, sex-dependent restrictions on dress and grooming necessarily involve
action that is “motivated,” at least in part, by the sex of the employees to whom they apply.
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53

burdensome consequences. On the other hand, if we assume that the
challenged restriction does not involve treatment that is based on sex, then
evidence of unequal burdens should be entirely immaterial, because absent
proof that the differential treatment in question was intentionally made to
depend on sex, there can be no claim of discrimination under a disparate
54
treatment theory. In either case, the question of unequal burdens seems entirely
beside the point. It has the character of a doctrine invented to deal with a
category of restrictions that are presupposed as requiring sui generis treatment.
But, of course, whether sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation
really ought to be treated as sui generis is an aspect of the very question under
investigation!
This difficulty is worth some elaboration. The unequal burdens test
effectively creates a rule under which sex-dependent restrictions on personal
presentation are to be regarded as non-discriminatory in the absence of proof
that the challenged restrictions create different burdens as between men and
women. This means that even if an adverse action against an employee is
directly predicated upon the employee’s being a man or woman, we are not
justified in classifying that action as “because of” sex unless the action’s
consequences are more burdensome for one sex than the other. So, for example,
even though our original hypothetical employer’s decision to fire the male
employee for wearing the frilly pink dress was undisputedly predicated upon
consideration of the employee’s sex, under the unequal burdens approach, we
cannot regard that decision as differential treatment based on sex unless we can
first establish that the policy under which the employer’s action was taken is
more burdensome for men than for women.
The problem lies in stating a coherent basis for this gloss on the definition
of disparate treatment without begging the central question under investigation:
how is it possible that sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation do
not constitute objectionable discrimination based on sex? Ordinarily—that is,
outside the context of matters relating to dress and grooming—if an adverse
employment action against an employee is the result of a policy that expressly
sets different standards for men and women, then the action is prima facie
55
discriminatory, and the only question that remains is whether the action or
policy is nevertheless justifiable as a bona fide occupational qualification
56
(BFOQ). Indeed, even in the absence of an expressly sex-dependent policy, the

53. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An employer’s policy
amounts to disparate treatment if it treats men and women differently on its face.”); see id. at 854 n.9
(stating that there was no need to reach plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim, because defendant’s
policy was facially discriminatory and hence plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on a
theory of disparate treatment).
54. In other words, proof that a sex-independent grooming or appearance restriction creates
unequal burdens would not, as a general rule, suffice to establish that the restriction was prima facie
discriminatory.
55. See Frank, 216 F.3d at 853; see also Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132
(3d Cir. 1996) (“When open and explicit use of gender is employed . . . discrimination is in effect
‘admitted’ by the employer . . . .”).
56. Frank, 216 F.3d at 853–54; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000) (setting forth the BFOQ
exception).
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dispositive question for liability under a Title VII disparate treatment claim is
whether the employer’s action was based (at least in part) on consideration of
57
the employee’s sex. Proof of facts giving rise to such an inference suffices to
58
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Certainly, it is not usually the
case—outside the context of challenges to restrictions on personal
presentation—that an employer could avoid disparate treatment liability by
admitting that it subjected male and female employees to differentially adverse
workplace requirements and then calling upon the plaintiff to prove that the
different requirements created burdens of unequal magnitude (under some
undefined metric) as between men and women. Yet this is precisely the
justificatory strategy that the unequal burdens test seems to endorse in the
context of employer restrictions on personal presentation.
59
Let us take a closer look at Jespersen. The case involved a set of sex60
dependent restrictions on personal presentation—the “Personal Best” policy —
that applied to various beverage servers and bartenders employed by Harrah’s
61
Casino. The policy required, inter alia, that women wear “eye and facial
62
63
makeup,” style their hair in a particular way, and wear nail polish, while it
required men to wear their hair short and prohibited the wearing of facial
64
makeup, “faddish hairstyles,” or colored nail polish. Jespersen’s objection to
Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy was that the requirement that women wear
65
makeup was itself prima facie discriminatory because it applied only to
66
women. It was not disputed that, under the policy, whether an employee’s
failure to wear makeup provided the basis for adverse employment action was
predicated solely and expressly upon the employee’s sex. Yet, characterizing the
casino’s sex-dependent requirements as being part of “an appearance policy that
applied to both male and female bartenders [that] was aimed at creating a
professional and very similar look for all of them,” the Jespersen majority
asserted that the “material issue” was whether the policy as a whole was more

57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment
practice . . . .”). For purposes of simplifying discussion, I set aside the question of whether the
“motivating factor” test of discrimination applies in cases that do not involve “mixed motives.” See
Sullivan, supra note 13, at 933–34.
58. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F.3d 38, 56–57 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining the plaintiff’s
burden); see generally Sullivan, supra note 13, at 925–33.
59. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
60. See id. at 1107 (describing the program).
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. The makeup policy applicable to female employees provided as follows: “Make up (face
powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary [sic] colors. Lip
color must be worn at all times.” Id. (quoting from the policy) (emphasis omitted). The policy
applicable to male employees, on the other hand, stated: “Eye and facial makeup is not permitted.”
Id.
66. See id. at 1109 (“. . . Jespersen argues that the makeup requirement itself establishes a prima
facie case of discriminatory intent . . . .”).
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burdensome for women than for men. Then, noting that Jespersen had failed to
provide any evidence supporting such a conclusion (e.g., “evidence of the
relative cost and time required to comply with the grooming requirements by
68
men and women” ), the court upheld the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the casino on the question of whether the Personal Best program
69
imposed unequal burdens on women.
The sui generis character of the equal burdens approach to workplace
restrictions on personal presentation becomes obvious when we consider how
absurd it would be to apply that test in other contexts. Suppose, for example,
that a plaintiff brought a disparate treatment challenge to her employer’s
practice of firing female employees who failed to arrive at work by 8 a.m., but
not taking the same action as to male employees who arrived comparably late. I
do not want to deny that a court might be justified in holding that, without
further evidence, the fact that only women were fired for arriving at work after 8
a.m. would be insufficient to create a triable issue of discrimination. The
employer might have had reasons for the ostensibly differential treatment that
had nothing to do with the sex of the employees who were fired. If, however,
the employer admitted that it had a policy of firing all and only female
employees who arrived at work after 8 a.m., that would surely be sufficient to
establish that the plaintiff’s termination for arriving at work after 8 a.m. was in
70
turn predicated upon her sex and therefore prima facie discriminatory. And
would it not be absurd for the employer to rebut the claim of discrimination by
asserting that the 8 a.m. arrival requirement for women was part of a general
“Personal Punctuality” program that applied to all employees and that this
program also required all and only male employees to stay at work until 6 p.m.?
Furthermore, even if the employer really did maintain a separate 6 p.m.
departure policy that was applicable only to male employees, any issue as to
whether the burdens created by the dual policies were greater for women than
men would strike me plainly as irrelevant. The plaintiff’s complaint, after all, is
that the 8 a.m. arrival requirement is itself discriminatory, not that the “Personal
71
Punctuality” program as a whole is discriminatory. Yet, if the Jespersen unequal
burdens test were applied in this context, it is precisely the latter conclusion that
the plaintiff would be required to establish in order to prevail on her claim of
discrimination. In effect, application of the unequal burdens test would require a
procrustean transformation of the plaintiff’s original complaint—that the 8 a.m.
arrival policy is objectionably discriminatory because it applies only to female
employees—into the patently distinct claim that the employer’s arrival and

67. See id. at 1110 (citing Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2000);
Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1977)) (alteration added).
68. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110.
69. See id. at 1111.
70. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996).
71. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 6–7, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076,
No. 03-15045 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2003), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/
LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/360.pdf (“Harrah’s . . . tries to recast Jespersen’s challenge to the makeup
policy as a test of the casino’s appearance requirements as a whole, much as the trial court did. But
Jespersen has challenged only one aspect of the policy, the makeup requirement, and has no quarrel
with its other elements.”).
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departure policies, taken together, are objectionably discriminatory because the
overall burdens created by those policies are greater in magnitude for female
employees than they are for males.
What we should really want to say about the Personal Punctuality program
is simply that it is, by the employer’s own admission, discriminatory in two
respects: the 8 a.m. arrival requirement discriminates against women, and the 6
72
p.m. departure restriction discriminates against men. Any comparison of the
burdens created by these ostensibly paired restrictions should seem beside the
point.
So what happened in Jespersen? The court simply sidestepped the problem
of justifying the relevance of comparative burdens by assuming, without
argument, that the Personal Best policy had to be evaluated as a whole, rather
73
than “pars[ed]” into its component requirements. With this ipse dixit, the court
flatly rejected even the possibility that each of the two components of the
policy—the one imposing various restrictions on women and the other on
74
men—might have been independently discriminatory, which left as the only
remaining theory of liability the claim that the Personal Best policy was
discriminatory in respect of the comparative magnitude of the burdens that it
created.
The evident implausibility of applying the equal burdens test in the case of
my hypothetical disparate punctuality policy shows that the use of the test in
the context of sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation presupposes
that there is something special about dress and grooming restrictions that
75
warrants a sui generis approach. Thus, the fact that a set of sex-dependent
72. See David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 246–47
(2004) (describing the unequal burdens approach as endorsing a “double for nothing” claim
whereby “two instances of discrimination add[] up to none” (alteration added)).
73. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. In support of this assumption, the court cited a decision in
which the Eighth Circuit had upheld a hair-length restriction that was applicable only to male
employees against a Title VII challenge, because Congress likely did not intend for the statute to
have such “sweeping implications” and the male hair-length restriction at issue was part of a
reasonable and “comprehensive personal grooming code applicable to all employees.” Knott v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975). The Eighth Circuit, however, provided no more of
an explanation than the Jespersen court as to why the hair-length restriction itself could not be
discriminatory, even assuming that the policy of which it was a part was applied evenly to all
employees.
74. Judge Pregerson in his dissenting opinion resisted this move. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1116
(Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“The fact that a policy contains sex-differentiated requirements that affect
people of both genders cannot excuse a particular requirement from scrutiny.”). Interestingly, Judge
Kozinski in his separate dissent stated his agreement with the majority’s insistence that the
challenged makeup requirement be evaluated in the context of the Personal Best policy as a whole
but argued that it was obvious that the policy did in fact create a greater burden for women than for
men. See id. at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
75. Doubts about the relevance of unequal burdens analysis to disparate treatment claims are
only further accentuated when one considers how impertinent such an analysis would be in a case
involving restrictions on personal presentation that involved a forbidden classification other than
sex, such as race or national origin. Suppose, for example, that a restaurant owner tried to enforce a
workplace rule that required, say, all and only Asian employees to wear conical rice-field hats
secured with a chin strap. In a discrimination challenge by the Asian employees, would it not be
outrageous for a court to entertain seriously the restaurant owner’s claim that the requirement was
not discriminatory because an equally burdensome requirement—say, the wearing of a cowboy
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restrictions might—considered as a single policy—create burdens of equal
magnitude for male and female employees does not adequately answer the
question whether we should regard such restrictions as objectionable
discrimination, absent some account of why equality of burdens should be given
such prominence of consideration in this context.
VII. CONCERN FOR EQUALITY
So it seems, once again, that we still have made little progress in
understanding why sex-dependent workplace restrictions on personal
presentation should receive special and distinctive consideration under the laws
governing sex discrimination. To make headway, we must consider the basic
concerns and commitments that we take to be embodied in Title VII’s
prohibition of discrimination because of sex.
A useful place to start is with an argument that can be traced back to the
76
well-known case of Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. There, the
Fifth Circuit majority reasoned that it was not objectionably discriminatory for
an employer to require male employees to wear their hair short, while allowing
77
female employees to wear their hair at any length. This, as the Court explained,
was because the purpose of Title VII is to ensure equality of employment
opportunities among men and women and “to give all persons equal access to
78
the job market.” Title VII’s purpose is not to abolish every sex-dependent
practice from the workplace, no matter how significant the effect of a particular
79
practice on the equal availability of employment opportunities. The Court
quoted favorably from the D.C. Circuit’s per curiam opinion in Dodge v. Giant
Food, in which that court had characterized sex-dependent grooming restrictions
as workplace regulations “which do not represent any attempt by the employer
to prevent the employment of a particular sex, and which do not pose distinct
80
employment disadvantages for one sex.” The Dodge court had noted that
“[n]either sex is elevated by these regulations to an appreciably higher
81
occupational level than the other.”
We can grant that Title VII’s proscription of sex discrimination should be
interpreted as aiming to ensure that men and women enjoy formal equality of

hat—was imposed on non-Asian employees? I assume that most courts would analyze this sort of
race-dependent workplace restriction on dress as facially discriminatory, and that any further
examination of whether it creates an equal burden for employees of all races would be entirely
immaterial. Cf. Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14963 (D.N.J. 2004) (holding
that an otherwise unobjectionable restriction on male hair length stated a claim for discrimination
where the restriction’s application was alleged to depend on consideration of race). Again, we are
left to ask why matters should be different in the case of sex-dependent dress and grooming
restrictions.
76. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
77. See id. at 1092.
78. Id.
79. See id.; see also Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (making a
similar argument).
80. Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).
81. Id.
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82

opportunity. But the argument of Willingham and Dodge—that sex-dependent
restrictions on dress and grooming should not be regarded as objectionably
discriminatory simply because they do not affect the overall balance of
opportunities or positions formally available to women relative to men—surely
proves too much. For, on that reasoning, an employer could, consistent with
Title VII, enforce whatever sex-dependent workplace restrictions it wanted with
impunity, as long as it kept all of its positions open to members of both sexes.
Clearly, this is not the way that we would want to understand Title VII’s
proscription of sex discrimination, and courts have not limited the application of
Title VII in that way. Thus, for example, a workplace restriction can constitute
sex discrimination even if its application is limited to a highly sought-after
position that is filled predominantly by members of the sex to whom the
restriction applies (and hence could not be regarded as diminishing the
83
opportunities available to them). Even an employer who satisfies the
requirements of providing equality of opportunity to men and women can run
afoul of the sex discrimination laws if it applies conditions of employment that
84
are expressly tied to an employee’s sex. Moreover, the decisional law
concerning the impermissibility of employer enforcement of sex stereotypes
makes clear that Title VII not only mandates equality of opportunity, but also
places substantive limits on an employer’s ability to require that those
employees conform their behavior to certain types of sex-dependent norms as a
85
condition of employment.
That puts us back to where we started. For we are left again asking why
sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation should not be regarded as
per se discriminatory conditions of employment, and why they should be
excluded from the ambit of norms that are legally regarded as ones that
reinforce sex-based stereotypes.
Let us think about the purpose of Title VII’s proscription of sex
discrimination in a somewhat more general way than the Willingham court had
occasion to do. Everyone agrees that Title VII as it relates to sex should be
interpreted as having the aim of ensuring that men and women enjoy a certain
86
kind of equality. But we can understand the equality that the statute fosters as

82. Ironically, the inclusion of “sex” as a protected classification in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 reportedly resulted from an amendment introduced by a conservative congressman who
was believed to be opposed to the legislation as a whole but who thought that the amendment
would hinder its passage. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090 (citing Note, Employer Dress and
Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 965, 968 (1973); Note,
Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971)).
83. See Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 606–08 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting airline’s
argument that its maximum weight requirements for female flight attendants were not
discriminatory because the position was regarded as highly desirable in spite of that requirement).
84. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 131–32 (3d Cir. 1996).
85. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (plurality opinion); Smith
v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566, 571–74 (2004); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st
Cir. 1999).
86. Cf. Hugh Collins, Social Inclusion: A Better Approach to Equality Issues?, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 897, 908 (2005) (“Most explanations of antidiscrimination laws support the view
that the aim of the legislation is to promote some conception of equality.”).
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comprising at least three separable ideas. First, antidiscrimination laws in
general express a commitment to what might be called a principle of substantive
87
moral equality or anti-subordination, teaching that all individuals are entitled
to equal moral and legal respect and, more specifically, that an individual’s
moral and social standing cannot depend on the individual’s race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin. Second, Title VII mandates a certain formal equality
of treatment in the employment context, meaning (roughly) that male and
88
female employees who are alike should be treated alike. And third, it promotes
a degree of distributive equality, meaning (roughly) that male and female
employees should enjoy some measure of substantive equality in certain kinds
89
90
of goods they receive in relation to any given employment situation. If we
accept these three basic postulates, we have a slightly more focused way of
framing the question at hand. To wit: do sex-dependent workplace restrictions
on personal presentation give rise to objections from any of these notions of
equality; and if so, can those objections be overcome?
Consider, first, the objection of formal inequality. The principle of formal
equality is commonly expressed through the maxim “like cases ought to be
91
treated alike.” To be a bit more fussy, we might say that the principle of formal
equality is potentially violated, and a possible objection of formal inequality
arises, whenever some consideration is treated as sufficient reason to take
adverse action with regard to a person P, yet that same action would not be
taken with regard to some person Q as to whom that same consideration was
92
equally applicable.
Understood in terms of this simple schema, a potential objection of formal
inequality could arise in virtually every case involving a sex-dependent
restriction on personal presentation. That is, in every case in which an adverse
action is based on an employee’s violation of a sex-dependent restriction, the
affected employee will be able to assert that the same adverse action would not
be taken with regard to some other employee (viz., an employee of the opposite
sex) who engaged in that same conduct. In Jespersen, for example, an objection

87. See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (explaining the anti-subordination principle in the context of the Equal
Protection Clause).
88. See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1777 (2002) (observing that “formal equality arguments dominate
antidiscrimination caselaw” and discussing critically why this might be so).
89. I am using “goods” to refer not only to property and income but also employment
opportunities, job security, access to positions of power, and so forth.
90. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc);
cf. Sarah E. Burns, Apologia for the Status Quo, 74 GEO. L.J. 1791, 1795–96 (1986) (book review)
(distinguishing distributive inequality and formal inequality of treatment as “dual mechanisms” of
sex discrimination).
91. See Patrick S. Shin, Compelling Interest, Forbidden Aim: the Antinomy of Grutter and Gratz, 82
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 431, 452–53 (2005); see generally Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian
Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693 (2000).
92. Actually, my own view is that the principle of formal equality has a slightly more complex
structure than this, but I do not think further elaboration would be helpful here. I develop a
comprehensive account of the principle of formal equality elsewhere. See Patrick S. Shin, The Formal
Interpretation of Equal Treatment (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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from formal inequality could be articulated as follows: Darlene Jespersen was
fired for refusing to wear facial makeup, yet at the same time, male bartenders
93
who did not wear facial makeup were not subject to termination. In this way,
Jespersen—like any employee aggrieved by a sex-dependent restriction—could
raise a potential objection of formal inequality.
Of course, as is often observed, objections of formal inequality are all too
easy to sidestep. The claim that the ostensibly different treatment of individuals
violates the principle of treating like cases alike is almost always readily met
with an obvious response: the differential treatment in question is not, after all,
objectionable because the individuals in question were not similar in relevant
respects. Thus, as to Jespersen, if the charge of unequal treatment is understood
to be that Jespersen was treated differently from male bartenders, the
employer’s ready response is that she was not “similar” to those other
employees in all relevant respects.
There is a temptation to dismiss formal equality objections because they are
vacuous in the sense just demonstrated, absent some specification of what
counts as a “relevant” difference or similarity. But arriving at this specification is
precisely the value of working through an objection from formal inequality.
Such objections force us to think about the substantive principles to which we
would have to commit ourselves in order to regard particular differences
between individuals as relevant or not; they force us to specify some
institutionally legitimate principle under which the ostensibly differential
treatment at issue could be regarded as rationally consistent.
The question implicated by the formal inequality objection, then, is whether
there is such a principle—a principle that is consistent with antidiscrimination
law as a whole, that would allow us to say that Darlene Jespersen was in some
sense relevantly different from her male counterparts. I will return to this
question—which I take to be of central importance—at the end of this
discussion. Before doing that, though, let us consider the other objections from
inequality that I mentioned. For even if the formal inequality objection can be
met, the defender of sex-dependent dress and grooming restrictions must still
answer objections from the principle of substantive equality (the anti94
subordination principle) and objections from distributive inequality. I now turn
to these objections.
Sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation may be objectionable
under the principle of substantive equality to the extent that they depend upon
or express a judgment that women are in some way less worthy of respect than
men (or vice versa), or have a lesser legal, moral, or social standing and hence
are less entitled to object to unfavorable treatment. One might argue that all sexdependent restrictions of the sort we have been discussing are objectionable in
this way—that all such restrictions applicable to women depend on or express a
judgment that women are morally or legally inferior to men, and all such
restrictions applicable to men depend on or express the opposite judgment. But

93. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2006).
94. I am indebted to my colleague Jessica Silbey for urging me to consider this objection
explicitly.
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95

this claim seems too strong. No such judgment would seem to be implied, for
example, by a workplace uniform policy that required women to wear blue caps
and men to wear green ones. Yet, it would be hard to deny that some sexdependent presentational restrictions could be objectionable under a principle of
substantive equality. A policy that required women to wear a demeaning
costume while permitting men to wear ordinary attire, for example, would
rather starkly evince the attitude that women are subservient to (heterosexual)
men as objects of desire and sexual gratification rather than agents who share
co-equal social, moral and legal standing. Whether the same could be said for a
policy that required female employees to wear makeup (while forbidding males
from doing so) is perhaps more open to argument. If such an argument could be
made, the policy would be objectionable under a principle of substantive
equality or anti-subordination. Assuming that the sex discrimination provisions
of Title VII embody such a principle, it would follow that the policy should be of
potential statutory concern. More generally, sex-dependent workplace
restrictions on personal presentation seem to me potentially, but not necessarily,
objectionable under a principle of substantive equality or anti-subordination.
A similar account can be given with regard to the objection from
distributive inequality. There are at least three potential ways in which sexdependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation might be thought
objectionable from the viewpoint of distributive equality. First, one might argue
that such restrictions tend, on the whole, to create distributive inequalities
between men and women regarding employment-related economic goods and
opportunities such as job positions, opportunities for advancement,
employment-based income, etc. Second, it could be argued that such restrictions
may tend to produce distributive inequalities between men and women with
regard to less tangible (non-economic) and psychic goods such as inequalities in
social standing, psychological well-being, or self-respect. Third, one might argue
that sex-dependent restrictions produce distributive inequalities between men
and women with regard to the options they have as to their mode and manner of
presenting themselves in the workplace.
Whether any of these potential objections have any force seems a largely
empirical matter. Offhand, it is not obvious that the enforcement of sexdependent restrictions on dress and grooming within the workplace should,
simply by virtue of being sex-dependent, tend to produce inequalities between
men and women with respect to job opportunities, desirable positions, income,
or other economic goods. I want to make clear, however, what I am suggesting
here. To this end, it might be useful to distinguish between restrictions that
simply reinforce conventionally gendered social norms and restrictions that are
artificial, contrived, or synthetic. Insofar as the actual history of conventionally
gendered norms governing dress and grooming is entangled with our social
history of sex and gender inequality, it seems plausible that some sex-dependent

95. In a sense, workplace restrictions that require employees to dress and groom themselves in
a manner specified by the employer are inherently subordinating: they subordinate the employee to
the employer. See Fisk, supra note 39, at 1119–20. But the question of concern here is whether such
restrictions have a tendency to subordinate women to men (or vice versa) in a way that depends on
or expresses a judgment of legal, moral or social inferiority.
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restrictions reinforcing such norms might perpetuate such inequalities,
96
including various forms of distributive inequalities. It is less obvious that
97
artificial sex-dependent restrictions could have such effects. (Consider again a
silly rule requiring women to wear green and men to wear blue.) The point is
that the merit of the first objection from distributive inequality cannot be
determined a priori: whether sex-dependent restrictions on personal
presentation tend to create distributive economic inequalities is an empirical
question that depends, inter alia, on the nature of the restriction in question.
98
Some probably do, and some probably do not.
Similarly, as to the second potential objection from distributive inequality,
it would be difficult to say, without due empirical investigation, that sexdependent restrictions on dress and grooming in general tend to produce sexbased inequalities in social standing, psychological well-being, or self-respect.
Yet it also seems true that some such restrictions could be expected to have
99
precisely that tendency.
96. See Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1395, 1432 (1992) (arguing that laws that endorse conventionally gendered norms of dress and
grooming “legitimate the existing allocation of gender roles and expectations . . . [and] therefore
reinforces gender inequality, male domination, and the subordination of women”); cf. Katharine T.
Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace
Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2569 (1994) (arguing that we should be wary of even apparently
“trivial” norms such as the rule that women wear skirts and so should “ask whether there is
something in the cultural coding of skirts that disadvantages their wearers by making them seem,
say, less professional and more ornamental or vulnerable than those who wear pants”).
97. Thus, from the perspective of the first distributive inequality objection, the usual legal
attitude of permissiveness toward conventionally gendered restrictions and skepticism toward
artificial ones, cf. Post, supra note 3, at 29–30 (arguing that the case law tends to regard restrictions
that “track” conventional norms as nondiscriminatory and those that “violate” traditional standards
as discriminatory), seems in some ways completely backward.
98. If we include leisure time (time not expended on employment-related activities) as a
relevant category of goods, one might argue that the makeup requirement at issue in Jespersen
provides a straightforward example of a presentational restriction that tends to produce a
distributive economic inequality. This point was taken by Judge Kozinski to be perfectly obvious. See
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
99. Thus, for example, a workplace policy requiring men but not women to wear a necktie
might not give rise to the second distributive inequality objection (at least not in any immediately
apparent way), see Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1977), but a policy
requiring female employees to wear a demeaning uniform that increased the potential of sexual
harassment would be seriously problematic for the reasons embodied in the second distributive
inequality objection—viz., in virtue of its tendency to result in a differential diminishment of the
social standing of women or in an erosion of the social foundations of their ability to enjoy selfrespect. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding sex discrimination
where female employee was required to wear revealing uniform that led to her being sexually
harassed); see also Marentette v. Mich. Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (similar, but
dismissing complaint on other grounds). I do not deny that restrictions on dress and grooming
might, in general, tend to have an adverse effect on everyone’s psychological well-being or self-respect
insofar as such restrictions tend to inhibit personal expression and may force some individuals to
present themselves in a manner that is at odds with their self-image or practical identity. But one
would not think—although this is little more than conjecture—that such restrictions by their nature
would affect men or women differentially, thereby producing inequalities in the distribution of
psychic goods or self-respect. Of course, the unequal application of sex-dependent restrictions might
produce such inequalities; any policy that called for such uneven application might very well be
objectionable on the basis of this second objection from distributive inequality. See Carroll v. Talman
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The third potential objection based on distributive inequality argues that
sex-dependent restrictions are problematic not just to the extent that they
indirectly give rise to inequality in the distribution of economic goods or psychic
goods (such as the social bases of self-respect), but because they directly affect
the distribution of valuable goods: the options available for choosing one’s
manner of personal presentation in the workplace. It seems to me perfectly
plausible to say that these options are of real value to us. Being employed, after
all, often means spending the majority of one’s waking hours in the workplace,
and insofar as we have reason to care about how we present the surface of our
physical bodies to others in that context, we have reason to care about the
options available to us for such presentation. By the same token, gross
inequalities in the distribution of such options should raise cause for concern,
either because they are inherently unjust or because such inequalities might be
symptomatic of other unjust conditions in the particular institutional contexts in
100
which they arise.
Thus, one might object to a requirement forcing female employees to wear
contact lenses instead of glasses while allowing male employees the option of
wearing either on the straightforward grounds that such a requirement would
reduce the options available to women relative to men in respect of the overall
101
number of permissible modes of personal presentation. In contrast, one might
think that a policy that female employees wear makeup, if paired with a policy
that prohibited male employees from doing the same, would not give rise to an
objection from inequality of presentational options, insofar as the paired
requirements would not create any inequality in the overall number of such
102
options available to men versus women.
There are some obvious problems with reading Title VII to encompass a
concern for distributive equality with respect to presentational options in the
workplace. First of all, the case law to date has not seriously attempted to read
any such concern into the statute. Indeed, many cases are hard to reconcile with
such an interpretation. For example, there is a long line of decisions that refuse
to regard as actionably discriminatory sex-dependent hair-length restrictions
that require men to wear their hair short while not imposing any similar

Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032–33 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that employer’s
requirement that all and only women wear a particular uniform while men were allowed to choose
their own attire was “demeaning to women” and constituted disparate treatment in violation of Title
VII); see also O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Oh. 1987)
(finding sex discrimination on similar grounds, where female employees, but not males, were
required to wear a “smock”).
100. For example, if a particular workplace had a prevalence of sex-dependent restrictions on the
options for personal presentation available to female employees that were unpaired with
comparable restrictions on males, then that might be thought symptomatic of deeper conditions of
inequality within that workplace.
101. See Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 789–90 (D.D.C. 1973) (concluding that
precisely such a policy was discriminatory), vacated in part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir.
1976); see also Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032–33. Note that I argued above that the outcome in Carroll might
also be explained in terms of the second objection from distributive inequality. Thus, any given
particular sex-dependent restriction might be objectionable on more than one ground, and my
arguments should not be understood to suggest otherwise.
102. This sort of argument would of course tend to support the outcome in Jespersen.
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103

limitation on women. Similarly problematic is my simple hypothetical case of
the employer who terminates the male employee for wearing a frilly pink dress.
One would think that such unpaired, sex-dependent restrictions should provide
straightforward examples of sex discrimination if the statute were read to
encompass a concern for distributive inequality with respect to presentational
options. But those particular restrictions are not considered discriminatory
under current case law.
A further and more fundamental skeptical worry about the equality of
options rationale is whether the right way to measure the aggregate value of a
set of options is simply to count them. There is substantial reason to doubt
whether we should be content to regard any paired set of sex-dependent
restrictions as non-discriminatory simply on the assumption that the pairing
will ensure that the restrictions do not create any distributive inequality with
respect to presentational options, because the value of the options eliminated by
the paired restrictions might be very different. For example, it might be true that
a restriction requiring women to wear makeup while forbidding men from
doing so would not create any inequality across sex in the total number of
options held. However, one wonders whether something important is being
missed if we ignore the possibility that the option to wear makeup might not
have the same value for men (whether in the aggregate, or in particular cases) as
104
the option not to wear makeup might have for women. In other words,
counting the total number of presentational options affected by a particular
restriction might not be the best, or even a useful, way of measuring distributive
inequalities.
I am doubtful that this difficulty can be adequately resolved. If it cannot,
then it likely spells doom for the usefulness of thinking about distributive
equality with respect to presentational options at all, unless a systematic method
can be developed for assigning values to particular options regarding personal
presentation. Still, it is worth being aware of the equality of options rationale,
because for all its problems, I think it has sufficient surface plausibility to help
explain the tendency of courts like Jespersen to presume the permissibility of
paired sex-dependent restrictions on workplace presentation.
To summarize, there are at least three ideas of equality under which sexdependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation might be regarded as
objectionable: the principle of formal equality, the principle of substantive
equality (or of anti-subordination), and various notions of distributive equality.
To the extent that these precepts of equality describe the fundamental purposes
of Title VII, one strategy for justifying the permissibility of sex-dependent
workplace restrictions on personal presentation might be to show that such
restrictions—either in general, or in particular cases—do not raise serious
103. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998); Tavora v. N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977);
Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Airlines, 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537
F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash
Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 1254 (N.D.
Ind. 1998).
104. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (making a similar point).
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concerns under any of these principles. If one could show this, one might
succeed in establishing that such restrictions should be regarded as being
outside the ambit of Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of sex.
The majority’s opinion in Jespersen seems to me best understood as an
inchoate attempt at this kind of argument. The trouble is—and perhaps this is
why Jespersen is ultimately so unsatisfying—the court’s unequal burdens
approach seems to presuppose that the only potential equality objection
implicated by the casino’s “Personal Best” policy was that it might lead to an
inequality of distribution with regard to the burdens of compliance with the
policy as a whole. But that presupposition requires a peculiarly narrow view of
the types of inequalities that are of potential concern to Title VII. The Jespersen
majority was surely right to assume that dress and grooming restrictions that
create unequal burdens of compliance are potentially objectionable as sex
discrimination, but it failed to take seriously the possibility that the Personal
Best policy or its individual components might be objectionable under other
notions of equality that are central to the statute.
In particular, the Jespersen court completely ignored the potential objection
of formal inequality to the casino’s makeup requirement. So let us now return to
105
the discussion of that objection that I earlier postponed. The formal inequality
objection, again, is that the casino’s makeup policy suffered from a sort of
rational inconsistency: it called for adverse action against Jespersen on the basis
of her refusal to wear makeup, while not calling for adverse action against her
male counterparts even though they also did not wear makeup. As I conceded
above, that claim of inequality is not especially interesting in itself, because the
response is so obvious: Jespersen’s differential treatment under the makeup
policy was justified because she was relevantly different from her male
counterparts.
Here, however, is the rub. A purported difference between individuals that
might otherwise rationalize their different treatment cannot be considered
relevant if there is some institutionally authoritative principle saying that the
purported difference cannot provide sufficient reason for the type of action at
106
issue. For example, if an employer fires P for doing x yet fails to fire Q for
doing the same thing, the employer could not defeat a claim of formal inequality
by citing the fact that P was Asian, while Q was Caucasian. Obviously, the
antidiscrimination laws tell us that this purported difference cannot provide a
legitimate reason for treating P and Q differently. Thus, the employer could not
answer the objection by appealing to that particular difference.
In Jespersen, just what is the relevant difference between Jespersen and her
male counterparts? The claim implicit in the formal inequality objection—the
substantive claim that gives the formal objection its moral significance—is that
the only difference between them was their sex and that there is no
institutionally legitimate principle under which that consideration could have
provided a permissible reason for treating Jespersen differently. This last claim, I
contend, is the real crux of the formal inequality objection. It is a claim that
cannot go unaddressed, because it seeks to dislodge the hidden linchpin of
105.
106.

See supra p. 513.
See Shin, supra note 91, at 453–55.
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Jespersen—the assumption that it is not per se illegitimate (i.e., discriminatory) to
make workplace restrictions on presentation depend on consideration of sex,
and that is only impermissible to do so if such restrictions create distributive
107
inequalities or subordinate one sex to the other.
So, what would it take to overcome this challenge? What would have to be
true in order for Jespersen’s objection to fail? The answer is straightforward: in
order for Jespersen’s objection from formal equality to fail, there must exist
some institutionally legitimate principle under which the very fact that
Jespersen is a woman could provide sufficient reason to treat her differently
from her male counterparts.
Is there such a principle? One thing is certain: if my analysis is correct, the
existence of such a principle is necessarily implicit in the current decisional law
permitting sex-dependent restrictions on personal presentation to survive
discrimination analysis. In other words, if those decisions are regarded as
108
consistent with principles of formal equality, we must also regard them as
committed to the existence of some institutionally legitimate principle that
allows an employee’s sex to be a relevant reason for holding her to one
presentational standard while holding employees of the opposite sex to different
standards. If there is no such principle, then those cases must be wrongly
decided.
But, again, if there is such a principle, what could it be? Any answer here is
bound to be controversial, but it would have to be founded on a notion that we,
as a society, have reason to value and therefore preserve a state of affairs in
which certain types of behaviors relating to the manner of presenting oneself to
109
others are engaged in predominantly by members of one sex but not the other.
To put it another way, the rationalizability of sex-dependent workplacepresentation rules must depend on the idea that, even granting that sex and
110
gender or gender-performance can be conceptually disaggregated,
we
nevertheless have reason to maintain a state of affairs in which sex and gender
remain linked as a matter of fact—i.e., a state of affairs in which biological males
behave in masculine ways and biological females behave in feminine ways.
111
Insofar as that idea could be considered institutionally basic, one could posit,
as an institutionally legitimate principle, that employees have no right to
demand that adverse employment actions based on the manner of their personal
presentation be justified in terms that do not appeal to consideration of sex. The

107. The need to consider the formal equality objection (and, more importantly, the substantive
principles that such an objection implicates) can be seen most clearly in a case of paired restrictions
that do not produce any substantive or material inequalities—e.g., a requirement that female
employees wear blue caps and that male employees wear green ones. Ignoring the formal equality
objection would ignore the possibility that such a restriction could be objectionable even absent any
proof of associated substantive or material inequalities.
108. On my view, principles of formal equality ultimately reduce to requirements of rational
consistency, and we ordinarily presume that the law on the whole is itself rationally consistent.
109. My remarks here are limited to the context of conduct relating to personal presentation in
the workplace.
110. See generally Case, supra note 2.
111. By an institutionally basic value, I mean a value that determines the institution’s principles
of justification but cannot itself be justified in institutional terms.
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real upshot of the formal inequality objection to sex-dependent restrictions on
personal presentation, then, is a challenge to this substantive principle and the
basic values it embodies. The thrust of the formal objection is that we are not
justified in valuing a state of affairs in which the linkage of sex and gender
112
persists.
At this juncture, I offer no view as to whether the value being imagined
113
here—the social value of a linkage between sex and gender—is defensible; nor
do I offer any argument as to whether such a value could ultimately be
consistent with a general commitment to substantive and distributive equality
among the sexes, or to antidiscrimination law generally. My claim is only that a
commitment to this value must be presumed to underlie the body of law that
says that sex-dependent workplace restrictions on personal presentation do not
constitute sex discrimination. As we have seen, much of the surface logic that
courts have employed to uphold sex-dependent presentational restrictions
against challenges of discrimination turns out to be, on the whole, inconclusive
at best and at times little more than exercises in question-begging. In the end,
perhaps the doctrinal confusions and tangles those decisions seem to engender
are best understood as the result of trying to reconcile a commitment to ensuring
that men and women enjoy a meaningful parity of economic, social, and psychic
well-being with a desire to preserve a social decorum that keeps them
behaviorally distinct: Let substantive and economic equality obtain, but vive la
différence.

112. It could be possible, of course, that we might not be morally justified in seeking to enforce a
linkage of sex and gender even if the value of such a linkage was institutionally basic. In that case,
the further question would be the extent to which antidiscrimination law could be regarded as
aiming at the transformation of that basic value. Cf. Post, supra note 3, at 31–32 (arguing in favor of a
conception of antidiscrimination law that recognizes some social practices as “inevitable” and even
constitutive of categories such as race and gender while at the same time seeking to transform or
reshape such practices).
113. What would have to be proved in order to defend this value is not that there is a social
value attributable to the fact that men and women present themselves differently in the workplace,
but that—and this is in my view a more difficult proposition—whatever it is of value that subsists in
sex-differentiated behavior in respect of dress and grooming could not be preserved (or would be
diminished) if gender differences were not tightly linked to sex.

